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I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change poses an imminent threat to all of planet
Earth that transcends national boundaries.1 In response, a
* Editors’ Note: The IPCC published the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) on
August 6, 2021. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate
Change
2021:
The
Physical
Science
Basis
(2021),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
This article was already finalized for publication, and therefore references the
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report
Summary for Policymakers, infra note 1.
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate
Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers, at 8 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf
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majority of the world’s countries have made some form of
international commitment to protect the environment and
mitigate the effects of climate change.2 For example, 195
countries have signed the Paris Agreement, committing to
pursue national efforts to limit the increase the global average
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3 The European Union (EU)
has also enacted directives committing its member states to
pursue national efforts to increase the development and
implementation of renewable energy, consistent with the
obligations of the Paris Agreement.4 Beyond making public
declarations, these agreements in and of themselves do not
actually provide a legal mechanism to enforce large substantive
parts of the agreements.5 In other words, there is no internal
enforcement mechanism written into these agreements to
provide a way to hold states6 accountable for their commitments.
As the threat of climate change intensifies,7
environmentalists are using creative legal mechanisms to hold
[hereinafter 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report].
2. See, e.g., The Paris Agreement, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (noting that the
Paris Agreement “brings all nations into a common cause to undertake
ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects”); What is
the Kyoto Protocol?, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (“The Kyoto
Protocol operationalizes the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change by committing industrialized countries . . . to limit and reduce
greenhouse gases emissions in accordance with agreed individual targets”.).
3. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris
Agreement,
U.N.
Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec.
12, 2015)
[hereinafter Paris Agreement]; see 7. d Paris Agreement: Chapter XXVII
Environment,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION
(Dec.
12,
2015),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7d&chapter=27&clang=_en.
4. See, e.g., Renewable Energy Directive, EUR. COMM’N (July 16, 2014),
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energydirective/overview_en (last updated Dec. 10, 2020) (explaining EU Directives
2009/28/EC and 2018/2001/EU).
5. David Roberts, The 5 Biggest Deceptions in Trump’s Paris Climate
Speech, VOX (June 2, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2017/6/2/15727984/deceptions-trump-paris-speech (explaining
the non-binding nature of the Paris Agreement, stating that participating
countries “determine their own targets and their own policies” and that “they
can fail to meet the targets, without penalty”).
6. This Comment will use the term “state” to refer to countries and
nations in accordance with standard international terminology.
7. 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 8.
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actors accountable for their impacts on the environment.8 This
Comment proposes that a form of international arbitration
called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) may be a viable
legal framework to enforce states’ international environmental
commitments.9 ISDS is a legal framework commonly written
into international investment agreements (IIAs) that allows
investors from one state to bring arbitration actions directly
against a foreign state for breaches of the IIA.10 An investor may
bring an ISDS action against a foreign state for damages when
he or she invests in the state relying on the state’s policy, and
the state then changes its policy in a way that hurts the
investment.11 To enforce a states’ international environmental
agreement under, for example, the Paris Agreement or an EU
Directive, a renewable energy investor could bring an ISDS
claim against a state who committed to decrease GHG emissions
or promote renewable energy under the international
agreement. If the investor relied on the agreement in making
his or her investment, and the state then enacts a policy
drastically inconsistent with the agreement, the investor may be
able to attain damages from the state.12 In principle, the
prospect of responding to ISDS claims and paying investors
large sums in damages would incentivize states to act in
8. See, e.g., James Conca, Atmospheric Trust Litigation—Can We Sue
Ourselves Over Climate Change?, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2014, 9:42 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/11/23/atmospheric-trustlitigation-can-we-sue-ourselves-over-climate-change/#117396b40056
(explaining state and federal Atmospheric Trust Litigation); Sara Mogharabi
et al., Environmental Citizen Suits in the Trump Era, ABA, (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publicati
ons/natural_resources_environment/2017-18/fall/environmental-citizen-suitstrump-era/ (describing citizen suits brought under the Clean Water Act, Clean
Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Endangered Species
Act).
9. Caroline Simson, Int’l Law Seen as Path to Fight Climate Change,
LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2019, 7:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1151466.
10. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor State-Dispute
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD
WORKING
PAPERS
ON
INT’L
INV.
10
(2012),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en; Tim R. Samples, Winning and
Losing Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 115, 116 (2019)
(citing Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grant Bargain, 46
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 66, 77 (2005)).
11. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 9.
12. Simson, supra note 9.
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accordance
with
their
international
environmental
commitments.
Part II of this comment provides a background on the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement system and the two most
common fora for ISDS claims. Part II also discusses some
common advantages and disadvantages of ISDS. Part III lays
out an example of how ISDS works in the context of an actual
case, Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. and Energía Solar Luxembourg
S.À.R.I. v. Kingdom of Spain (“E.S.L. v. Spain”).13 Part IV
briefly explains the current state of the climate crisis and the
importance of renewable energy. Finally, Part V explains the
logistics of how ISDS might be used to enforce international
environmental agreements and considers some foreseeable
roadblocks.
II.

INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

A. What is Investor-State Dispute Settlement?
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a legal
mechanism for resolving claims that arise from breaches of
international investment treaties.14
Under ISDS, foreign
investors can obtain damages from foreign states that have
breached their treaty obligations.15 In contrast to most domestic
dispute resolution systems, ISDS allows private investors to
bring claims directly against states through the arbitration
system.16
The vast majority ,approximately eighty-nine percent, of
international investment agreements (IIAs) that provide for
international ISDS are in the form of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs).17 BITs establish investment commitments
between two individual states.18 While most ISDS provisions
are found in BITs, some multilateral agreements between more
than two states also contain provisions providing for ISDS.19 For
13. Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/36, Award (May 4, 2017) [hereinafter E.S.L. v. Spain].
14. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 10.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Samples, supra note 10, at 117.
17. Id. at 126.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 127.
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example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
a trade and investment treaty entered into by Canada, Mexico,
and the United States as well as the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT), an international energy treaty which currently binds
fifty-three countries, both contain ISDS provisions resembling
those commonly found in BITs.20
The presence of ISDS within investment treaties
strengthens the reliability of states’ commitments to
international investors and decreases the risks posed by
investing in foreign states. Because the potential costs of ISDS
are so great for a respondent host state,21 ISDS, in principle,
creates a powerful incentive for states to honor the commitments
they have made in investment treaties.22
1. History of ISDS
Before the establishment of ISDS, foreign investors had to
depend on domestic arbitration systems or diplomatic processes
to recover damages caused by another state’s violation of
investment treaty obligations.23 According to the United
Nations, in the decade and a half before the first BITs came into
force, there were 875 takings of foreign investment properties in
over sixty countries with no effective remedy.24
IIAs including ISDS provisions have greatly increased in
number over the past thirty years. As of 1990, about 500
international investment treaties had been signed;25 as of 2017,
more than 3,300 international investment treaties had been

20. See, e.g., The Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, ¶ 4, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080
U.N.T.S. 100; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 11,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289.
21. See, e.g., Samples, supra note 10, at 144 (“[T]he net ISDS losses of
Belize are worth almost one year of government spending). See, also, id. at
149–50 (“UNCTAD calculates that a successful claimant is awarded about
$522 million on average . . . Poland . . . has paid in excess of $4 billion in ISDS
settlements.”).
22. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 10.
23. See id. at 9.
24. Scott Miller & Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A
Reality Check, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 5 (Jan. 2015), https://csiswebsite-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/150116_Miller_InvestorStateDispute_We
b.pdf.
25. Samples, supra note 10, at 120.
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signed.26 The number of ISDS settlements and arbitrations have
also risen dramatically over the past decade alongside the rise
in ISDS provisions.27
According to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), about one
hundred ISDS claims were initiated during the fifteen-year
period between 1987–2002.28 As of 2003, that number had more
than quadrupled and over five hundred ISDS cases were filed in
the ten year period between 2003–2013.29
The emergence of BITs and the establishment of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) reformed the system of enforcing fair treatment of
international investors.30 After the creation of BITs and ICSID,
parties could bring claims of unfair treatment of investors in
front of a neutral panel.31 In the face of such a neutral panel,
unlike in many domestic dispute settlement forums,
international investors are treated with equal legal status as the
states against which they bring their claims.32
Some ISDS cases challenge states’ policies or changes in
policies as breaches of IIAs. While all sovereign states are
accorded a level of deference and right to control their states’
policies, ISDS Tribunals have considered states’ policy
modifications as grounds for breaches in IIAs when those
policies are sufficiently detrimental to investors. 33
2. Two Major Fora for ISDS: ICSID and UNCITRAL
A majority of BITs that provide for ISDS call for the
arbitration to be governed by the ICSID Convention,34 the
26. Id.
27. Miller & Hicks, supra note 24, at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 5.
33. See, e.g., E.S.L. v. Spain, supra note 13 (considering whether Spain’s
policies modifying the regulatory regime for renewable energy constituted a
breach of the ECT); Philip Morris Brands S.á.r.l. v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip
Morris v. Uruguay] (considering whether Uruguay’s policies modifying the
marketing requirements for tobacco products constituted a breach of the BIT).
34. See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1720,
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United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL),35 or provide a choice between the two fora.36
ICSID was established by the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (ICSID Convention).37 The purpose of ICSID is to provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment dispute
claims between investors of contracting states and nationals of
other contracting states.38 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.39 Similar to
ICSID, UNCITRAL was created as a procedural mechanism for
resolving disputes arising from international investment
through conciliation or arbitration.40
The 2006 ICSID Regulations and Rules (ICSID Rules) and
the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Rules) both
provide similar procedural mechanisms for bringing and
resolving ISDS claims. For example, both the ICSID Rules and
the UNCITRAL Rules extend jurisdiction over any legal dispute
that arises directly out of an investment between a state and a
national of another state.41 The two systems also have similar
rules for appointing arbitrators to the arbitral tribunal, both of
which provide for an arbitral tribunal composed of three
arbitrators, unless the parties decide otherwise.42 Under the
ICSID Rules, unless the parties decide otherwise, each party
gets to appoint one arbitrator, and the parties must agree on the
appointment of a third arbitrator.43 Under the UNCITRAL
Rules, the third arbitrator is chosen by the two arbitrators
575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; International Center for
Settlement
of
Investment
Disputes
Convention,
Regulations
and Rules, ICSID/15 (Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter ICSID 2006 Regulations
and Rules].
35. G.A. Res. 65/22, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law Arbitration Rules (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration
Rules].
36. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 53.
37. ICSID Convention, supra note 34.
38. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 1.
39. UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35.
40. Id. at art. 17.
41. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 25;
UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at art. 1.
42. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 29;
UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at art. 7.
43. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 29.
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chosen by the parties.44 The ICSID Rules and UNCITRAL Rules
are also similar in that they provide for final, binding awards.45
Overall, the ICSID Rules and UNCITRAL Rules provide two
relatively similar arbitration processes.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of ISDS
1. Advantages of ISDS
ISDS generally serves as protection for international
investors, as it permits them to obtain compensation should the
investment lose significant value due to state actions.46 The
existence of ISDS and possibility of recovering from breaches of
treaty obligations encourages foreign investors to invest in
states without fear of unfair treatment or discrimination.47 As a
result, ISDS promotes foreign direct investment (FDI).48 ISDS
is especially useful for promoting FDI when one of the parties is
a low-income or middle-income country.49 Investment experts
have found that ISDS provisions effectively establish the
credibility of BITs and induce foreign direct investment (FDI).50
Increased FDI has been well-documented to benefit the national
economies for host states, especially developing economies.51 As
countries develop, an inward flow of FDI helps further the
country’s integration into the global economy.52
In addition to its economic benefits, FDI often improves the
environmental and social conditions of a host country.53 For
example, technologies brought to low-income and middle-income
44. UNCITRAL 2010 Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at art. 9.
45. Id. at art. 34; ICSID Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 53.
46. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 10, at 9.
47. Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 1 PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.
109 (Feb. 2016), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf
[hereinafter Assessing the TPP].
48. Miller & Hicks, supra note 24, at 6 (“The most apparent reason for the
rise in ISDS arbitrations is the concurrent rise in the stock of foreign direct
investment (FDI).”).
49. Assessing the TPP, supra note 47, at 109.
50. Id. at 111.
51. Foreign Direct Investment for Development Maximising Benefits,
Minimising
Costs,
OECD
5
(2002),
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 5.
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countries via FDI are generally more modern and environmentfriendly than the technologies that are available locally.54
The benefits and effectiveness of ISDS come largely from the
mere possibility of investors bringing a claim, rather than from
the actual arbitration of claims. Out of all of the BITs that are
in force with ISDS provisions, approximately ninety percent of
them have never seen a single dispute raised.55 While the
number and frequency of ISDS claims is rising, that rise is
consistent with and proportionate to a rise in FDI flow.56
2. Disadvantages of ISDS
Critics argue that ISDS undermines states’ sovereignty by
providing a way for investors to pressure host states into
changing policies that may have been determined to be for the
benefit of that states’ people.57 For example, foreign investors
from the oil and gas industries have brought claims against host
countries for enacting policies or taxes that harm oil and gas
investments, even when such policies were enacted to mitigate
climate change and promote environmental protectionism.58
There is also an issue of outcome distribution regarding
ISDS cases brought from different countries. ISDS claimants
are usually from high-income countries (86.25% of ISDS
claimants are from high-income countries), with far fewer
claimants from upper-middle income countries and lowermiddle income countries, and “no ISDS claims brought by
investors from low-income countries.”59 On the other hand,
respondents in ISDS cases are most frequently upper-middle
income countries and lower-middle income countries, with highincome countries as the respondent in only 27.55% of ISDS

54. Id. at 19.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 3.
58. See, e.g., Clayton v. Government of Canada, PCA No. 2009-04,
UNCTAD (2008), (discussing claims arising from Government rejecting
investors’ project following a negative environmental assessment); Mobil
Investments Canada Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/4, UNCTAD (2007), (discussing claims arising from Government
regulatory changes affecting investors projects with oil fields).
59. Samples, supra note 10, at 143.
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cases.60
Another major concern with ISDS is a lack of transparency.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), only eighteen of the eighty-five cases
heard before the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration
were made public.61 Settlements, which comprise a major
portion of ISDS cases, are even less transparent than ISDS
arbitration, and there are no public records of a majority of ISDS
settlements.62 ISDS might have a greater influence on states’
policy modifications if the results of those cases were more
readily available to the public.63
In light of criticisms surrounding ISDS, some countries have
begun to re-examine their relationship with ISDS and BITs in
general. For example, Indonesia and South Africa have publicly
stated their intent to allow existing IIAs containing ISDS
provisions to lapse, and Ecuador and Venezuela both officially
withdrew from the ICSID Convention.64
III. ISDS IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY
Eiser Structure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg
S.á.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain (E.S.L. v. Spain) is illustrative of a
successful ISDS case in which the claimants were renewable
energy investors.65 After Spain modified its regulatory and
economic regime for renewable energy projects following the
2011 general election,66 renewable energy investors from
various countries brought ISDS claims against the Kingdom of
Spain (Spain or Respondent).67 In E.S.L. v. Spain, investors
60. See id. at 143.
61. Assessing the TPP, supra note 47, at 117.
62. Samples, supra note 10, at 140.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 147.
65. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13.
66. See id. ¶ 137–150.
67. See, e.g., Antin Infrastructure Services Lux. S.a.r.l. v. Kingdom of
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, UNCTAD (2013) (involving claimant
renewable energy investors from Luxembourg and Netherlands); Cube
Infrastructure Fund SIVAC v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20,
UNCTAD (2015), (involving claimants renewable energy investors from
France and Luxembourg); European Solar Farms v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case No. Arb/18/45, UNCTAD (2018) (involving claimant renewable energy
investors from Denmark); Itochu Corp. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
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from Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (U.K.) initiated
arbitration against Spain. Claimants argued, among other
things, that Spain denied them fair and equitable treatment in
violation of the Energy Treaty Charter by enacting the
aforementioned policy changes.68 This Section describes the
procedural mechanisms used in E.S.L. v. Spain and the
substantive arguments considered by the Tribunal in deciding
the case in favor of the Claimant investors.
A. Factual Background
In 2001, the European Union (EU) adopted a policy of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) through
development of renewable energy.69 EU Directive 2001/77/EC
set out binding targets for EU member countries to develop
renewable energy, and declared that subsidies for the renewable
energy sector would be necessary to reach these targets.70 In the
years that followed, Spain adopted a series of measures to
regulate, facilitate, and incentivize the production of renewable
energy consistent with EU Directive 2001/77/EC.71 In February
of 2007, Spain adopted Royal Decree 661/2007 (“RD 661/2007”)
to increase remuneration for facilities using technologies to
comply with the targets outlined under EU Directive 2001/77/EC
and Spain’s Renewable Energy Plan.72 RD 661/2007 based
remuneration on the amount of energy produced by renewable
ARB/18/25, UNCTAD (2018) (involving claimant renewable energy investors
from Japan).
68. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 349 (“Claimants contend that
Respondent’s actions in entirely eliminating and replacing the . . . regime
violated Spain’s obligations under the ECT by (1) expropriating their
investment contrary to Article 13; (2) denying fair and equitable treatment
contrary to Article 10; (3) subjecting Claimants’ investments to unreasonable
measures, contrary to Article 10(1); and (4) failing to honor undertakings
entered into with Claimants’ investments, again contrary to Article 10(1).”).
69. Id. ¶ 101 (citing EU Directive 2001/77/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 238) 33-44).
70. Id.
71. See id. ¶ 102, 107. For example, Parliament of Electricity Law 54/1997
“provided the legal framework for regulation of electrical sector during most of
the period at issue” by guaranteeing investors of renewable energy reasonable;
1998, 2002, 2004 Royal Decrees regulated and facilitated production from
renewable sources and provided incentives to producers; 2005-2010 Renewable
Energy set out Spanish Government’s policy for attaining renewable energy
targets set by the EU in EU directive 2001/77EC.
72. Id. ¶ 109.
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plants and guaranteed that all production of renewable energy
would be subject to a new tariff scheme that permits investors
to choose between two types of tariffs. 73
Following the adoption of RD 661/2007, Claimants Eiser
Infrastructure Limited (EIL), a private limited company
incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom, and
Energía Solar Luxembourg S.á.r.l. (ESL), a limited liability
corporation incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg and
wholly owned by EIL (collectively, “Claimants”) invested in a
Concentrated Solar-Thermal Power (CSP)74 plant in Spain at its
initial stages of development.75 Claimants concluded that the
investment in CSP in Spain had promising business potential,
largely based on the favorable characteristics and expectation of
stable cash flow provided by RD 661/2007.76 Claimants acquired
a shareholding interest of eighty percent of the ASTE project by
October of 2007.77 After Claimants invested more than €126
million in the project, the plant began operation in October of
2012.78
In December of 2011, Spain elected a new prime minister
who “called for structural reforms in the energy system”.79 In
the years that followed, Spain implemented a series of changes
to the regime including a seven percent tax on energy
production,80 remuneration to be calculated based on capacity
instead of production,81 and the elimination of the tariff regime
set out in RD 661/2007.82 The new measures significantly
reduced the “subsidies paid to CSP and other renewables
generators,” and placed a new additional tax on the generators.83
73. Id. ¶ 148.
74. See Solar Energy Technologies Office, Concentrating Solar-Thermal
Power, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/concentrating-solarpower (last visited Aug. 10, 2021). Concentrated Solar-Thermal Power (CSP)
is a system that generates electricity by converting energy from sunlight into
heat energy using lenses to concentrate a large area of sun onto a receiver,
which drives a steam engine connected to an electrical power generator. Id.
75. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 117.
76. Id. ¶ 117.
77. Id. ¶ 120.
78. Id. ¶ 121.
79. Id. ¶ 137.
80. Id. ¶ 144.
81. Id. ¶ 148.
82. Id. ¶ 145.
83. Id. ¶ 150.
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Under the new regime, the ASTE project’s revenues “. . .
dropped sharply from those projected by the investors . . . under
the prior regime,”84 forcing the operating companies into debt.
EIL’s founding partner said the project lost all value, as the
original €126 million invested by Claimants was now valued at
only €4 million.85
B. Procedural Background
The states involved in this action, Spain, Luxembourg, and
the United Kingdom, are all member states of the Energy
Charter Treaty of 1998 (ECT), which established a legal
framework to promote cooperation in the energy field.86 The
ECT contains an ISDS provision in Article 26, which governs
treaty “disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of
another Contracting party relating to an Investment of the latter
in the Area of the former.”87 If parties cannot settle their case
amicably, Article 26 directs the investor party to submit the case
for resolution to either the ICSID Convention, UNICITRAL, or
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.88
In accordance with ECT Article 26, Claimants in this case
chose to request arbitration against Respondent under the
ICSID Convention, and the parties complied with the ICSID
Rules and Regulations.89 Parties agreed to constitute a tribunal
consisting of three arbitrators: one appointed by each of the two
parties, and a third arbitrator, the president of the tribunal,
appointed by the agreement of both parties.90 Respondent

84. Id. ¶ 151.
85. Id. ¶ 154.
86. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 2 (“This Treaty
establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term co-operation in
the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, in
accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter.”).
87. Id. at art. 26 ¶ 1.
88. Id. at art. 26 ¶ 4.
89. E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6, 7.
90. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. (noting that members of the Tribunal were “Professor John
R. Crook, a national of the United States, President, appointed by the
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council in accordance with the Parties’
agreement on the method of constitution; Dr. Stanimir Alexandrov, a national
of Bulgaria, appointed by Claimants; and Professor Campbell McLachlan QC,
a national of New Zealand, appointed by Respondent. Ms. Luisa Fernanda
Torres, ICSID Legal Counsel, . . . serve[d] as Secretary of the Tribunal”).
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challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear Claimant’s
claims,91 but the tribunal overruled Respondent’s objections to
jurisdiction and decided the case on its merits. 92
C. Claims
Claimants contended that they reasonably relied upon the
inducements and promises of Respondent, particularly the
regime established in RD 661/2007,93 and that Respondent
violated its obligations under the ECT by implementing
measures that changed the economic regime for CSP plants
under which Claimants invested €126 million in CSP.94
Claimants relied on the stability of Respondent’s regulatory
regime when they initially decided to invest in the ASTE project
and throughout the process of building the plants, and
Respondent’s regulatory authorities continually confirmed that
the project would be subject to the incentives provided by RD
661/2007 throughout the process.95
Claimants alleged that Respondents violated various
obligations under the ECT by drastically altering the regulatory
regime and substituting it with a totally different regime,
culminating in the elimination of the RD 661/2007 regime.96
Specifically, Claimants contended that Respondent violated
Articles 10 and 13 of the ECT by expropriating Claimants’
investment, denying Claimants fair and equitable treatment,
subjecting Claimants’ investments to unreasonable measures,
and failing to honor undertakings entered into with Claimants’
investments.97 Respondents disputed the claims and contended
that there had been no violations of the ECT.98

91. Id. ¶¶ 160, 208, 232, 250, 273, 299.
92. Id. ¶ 298. The Tribunal sustained one of Respondent’s objections to
jurisdiction on Claimants’ expropriation claim but found that it was not
necessary to decide the expropriation claim as the case could be resolved on
another basis.
93. Id. ¶ 347.
94. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 121.
96. Id. ¶ 348.
97. Id. ¶ 349.
98. Id. ¶ 350.
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D. Tribunal’s Analysis
The Tribunal assessed the Parties’ claims under Article
10(1) of the ECT, which states that, “Each Contracting Party
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage
and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make
Investments in its area,” including “a commitment to accord at
all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting
Parties fair and equitable treatment.”99 Taking into account the
context and purpose of the ECT, the tribunal concluded that
Respondent’s obligation under Article 10(1) necessarily includes
an obligation to provide “fundamental stability” in the essential
characteristics of the legal regime relied upon by investors
making long-term investments.100 Recognizing that regulatory
regimes usually change over time, the tribunal acknowledged
that investors must expect the possibility that reasonable
changes in the legal framework may be made and that states
maintain the right to modify their regulatory regimes to meet
evolving circumstances and public needs.101 However, the ECT
Article 10(1) obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment
means that states cannot alter regulatory regimes applied to
existing investment so radically that it deprives investors who
relied on those regimes of the value of their investment.102
While recognizing that Claimants could not have reasonably
expected that there would be no change whatsoever to the RD
661/2007, the Tribunal held that Article 10(1) entitled them to
expect that Respondent would not drastically and abruptly
revise the regime on which their investment depended in a way
that destroyed its value.103 The Tribunal found that Respondent
violated its obligation under Article 10(1) to accord Claimants
fair and equitable treatment when it eliminated a favorable
regulatory regime that was previously available to Claimants
and encouraged their investment in CSP, and replaced it with
an radically different regulatory approach that stripped

99. Id. ¶ 374 (quoting Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 10(1)).
100. Id. ¶ 382.
101. Id. ¶ 382.
102. Id.
103. Id. ¶ 419.
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Claimants of virtually all the value of their investment.104
E. Costs and Award
Violation of a treaty obligation that causes injury entitles
the injured party to compensation for the injury sustained.105
Under the ICSID Convention Rules and Regulations, the
Tribunal shall determine an award that shall be binding on the
Parties and determine the allocation of arbitration cost as part
of the award.106 In light of its determination that Respondents
violated Article 10(1) of the ECT by failing to accord fair and
equitable treatments to Claimants, the Tribunal awarded
Claimants €128 million as damages to be paid by Respondent.107
Acknowledging that Tribunals often award arbitration costs to
the prevailing party, the Tribunal determined that each party
shall bear its own costs because the case involved challenging
procedural and legal issues which both Parties addressed.108
IV. RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE CRISIS
The final Section of this paper advocates for the use of ISDS
to enforce states’ commitments to combat climate change.109 For
context of the importance and reason for mitigating climate
change, especially by promoting renewable energy, this Section
briefly explains the threats posed by climate change and the role
that renewable energy can play in mitigating those threats.
In 2014, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change published a Synthesis Report (Report),
providing key findings of evaluations of underlying scientific
understanding of climate change made by three working groups
of the IPCC.110 The Report states that the “[w]arming of the
climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to
104. Id. ¶¶ 413, 419.
105. Id. ¶ 423 (citing International Law Commission’s State
Responsibility Articles 31, which the Tribunal regards as the applicable
international law rules).
106. ICSID 2006 Regulations and Rules, supra note 34, at art. 60, 61.
107. E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 473.
108. Id. ¶ 484.
109. See infra Section V.
110. 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 2.
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millennia.”111 Current observed changes including the warming
of the atmosphere and ocean, melting of snow ice, and rising of
sea level,112 affect natural and human systems such as water
resources, species health, crop yields, and the frequency of
extreme weather events.113 Without substantial changes to
mitigate and adapt to climate change, these existing impacts are
predicted to continue to worsen alongside new risks including
reduced food security, reduced renewable water resources,
exacerbated human health problems, compromised human
activities such as agriculture and working outdoors, and
increased displacement of peoples.114
The Report states it is extremely likely that the dominant
cause of observed warming since the mid-twentieth century was
caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions together with other
anthropogenic forces.115 About seventy-eight percent of the total
GHG emissions increase from 1970–2010 are attributed to
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion
and industrial processes, and continued GHG emissions will
cause further warming and changes in the climate system.116
Mitigation of climate change therefore requires substantial
reductions of GHG emissions. Relative to fossil fuels, renewable
energy technologies have low specific GHG emissions into the
atmosphere, “which makes them useful tools for addressing
climate change”.117 Renewable energy technology likely has the
technical potential to satisfy the global energy demand.118
Policies promoting the research, development, and deployment
of renewable energy technologies have helped increase growth of
renewable energy in recent years.119 Such policies can help
reduce the risks associated with investing in renewable
energy.120
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 5.
117. See Special Rep. of the IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources and
Climate Change Mitigation, 174 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Renewable Energy
Report].
118. Id. at 10.
119. Id. at 15.
120. Id. at 194 (explaining financial and environmental risks associated
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There are a variety of international agreements or policies
under which parties have committed to combat climate change,
some specifically committing to increase the use of renewable
energy.121 Large portions of these agreements, however, are
unenforceable.122 For example, the Paris Agreement, currently
signed by 195 states, sets a substantive goal to limit the
“increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.”123
There is also a procedural requirement that each party must put
forward nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every five
years detailing the domestic measures it intends to achieve in
pursuit of the Agreement’s goals.124 Compliance with the NDCs
is generally enforceable by a committee set out in Article 15 of
the Agreement,125 but the actual substantive goals set out in
Article 2 of the Agreement, and in each Party’s individual NDCs,
are not enforceable under the Agreement.126
V.

USING ISDS TO ENFORCE ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS

ISDS typically serves as a form of protection for
international investors to ensure that the conditions under
which they made an investment will be honored, and to provide
for compensation when a host State significantly modifies those
conditions in a way that hurts the investment.127 In addition to
protecting individual investors, ISDS could also be used as a
legal mechanism to enforce environmental commitments that
states have made in international agreements such as the Paris
Agreement or EU Directive 2018/2001/EC.128
with investment in commercial renewable energy projects).
121. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 3; What is the Kyoto
Protocol?, supra note 2.
122. Roberts, supra note 5.
123. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2.
124. Id. at art. 4; see 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE
& ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/cop-21-paris/ (last visited Aug.
10, 2020).
125. Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 15.
126. Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate
21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J.F. 338, 352 (2017).
127. Simson, supra note 9.
128. Paris Agreement, supra note 3; see Directive 2018/2001/EC, 2018
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Both the Paris Agreement and EU Directive 2018/2001/EC
contain substantive commitments to mitigate climate change, in
addition to procedural requirements. For example, under Article
2 of the Paris Agreement, parties commit to “[h]olding the
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels,
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change”.129 EU Directive 2018/2001/EC,
which was established in part to help the EU meet its
commitments under the Paris Agreement to reduce GHG
emissions, established a goal for the EU to fulfill at least thirtytwo percent of its energy needs through the use of renewable
energy by 2030.130 Unfortunately, however, the agreements
themselves do not provide for a mechanism to enforce those
substantive commitments.
There are internally enforceable commitments in both the
Paris Agreement and EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, but these are
usually the procedural requirements. Under Article 4 of the
Paris Agreement, “[i]n order to achieve the long-term
temperature goal set out in Article 2,” “[e]ach Party shall
prepare, communicate and maintain successive national
determined contributions that it intends to achieve,” and “shall
pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving
the objectives of such contributions.”131 The word “shall” creates
a binding commitment.132 The procedural commitment set out in
Article 4 for each party to prepare nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) is enforceable through Article 15.133
Article 15 establishes an “expert-based and facilitative”
committee to “facilitate implementation and promote
compliance” with the Agreement.134 Similarly, EU Directive
O.J. (L 328/82). EU Directive 2018/2001/EC is a revised version of the original
EU Directive 2009/28/EC, which established an overall policy for production
and promotion of energy from renewable sources, and required the EU to fulfill
at least twenty percent of its total energy needs with RE by 2020, to be
achieved through attainment of individual countries.
129. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2.
130. EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, supra note 128.
131. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2.
132. Hongju, supra note 126, at 352.
133. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 15.
134. Id.
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2018/2001/EC requires member states to draft “renewable
energy action plans” and report their progress to the
Commission.135
Simply put: the Paris Agreement and the EU Directive
2018/2001/EC both provide enforcement mechanisms for the
procedural requirements of the agreement, but neither provide
for a way to enforce the parties’ substantive commitments to
limit GHG emissions or promote renewable energy to a specific
target. As these commitments are not internally enforceable,
ISDS could present an opportunity for investors to enforce
states’ commitments.
A. Logistics of Using ISDS to Enforce States’ International
Environmental Commitments
As demonstrated by E.S.L v. Spain, an investor may have a
valid ISDS claim challenging a states’ policy changes if they can
prove that (1) the host state had a stated policy; (2) an investor
from another state made an investment in the host state in
reasonable reliance of the stated policy; and (3) the host state
changed its policy or enacted a policy that did not match its
rhetoric in a way that significantly hurt the investor’s
investment in an unforeseen way.136 For an ISDS claim seeking
to enforce a states’ international environmental commitment,
the first element of the claim would most likely be a domestic
policy enacted in pursuit of the goals set out in an international
agreement such as the Paris Agreement or EU Directive
2018/2001/EC. Then, for the second element a foreign investor
must have made an investment in the state in reasonable
reliance of the states’ commitment or policy. Under agreements
such as the Paris Agreement or EU Directive 2018/2001/EC,
parties make public, transparent commitments that they will
reduce GHG emissions and promote renewable energy. It would
then be reasonable for an investor to rely on a states’ policies
that are consistent with those agreements, because the state has
committed to maintain policies in pursuit of the goals set out in
the agreement.
One example of a party that may be in the positions to bring

135. See Directive 2018/2001/EC, supra note 128, ¶ 30.
136. See infra, Section III.
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such a claim would be a renewable energy investor who invests
in a state relying on the state’s public commitment to reduce
GHGs and promote renewable energy. If the host state then
significantly changes the policy or enacts a policy that is
inconsistent with its international commitments, and the
investment is hurt by such changes, the investor may be able to
hold the state liable for damages through ISDS.
This type of ISDS case would enforce agreements like the
Paris Agreement and EU Directive 2018/2001/EC primarily
through deterrence. In principle, if states are aware that,
through these cases, they could potentially be liable for millions
or billions137 of dollars in damages when they enact policies
inconsistent with their prior agreements, they will be
incentivized to act in accordance with their agreements to avoid
such damages. In cases where the challenged policy is a national
policy put in place in pursuit of the international agreement, the
agreement itself may play a role in proving that the investor had
reason to rely on the policy. It is unclear whether the
international agreement itself could suffice as a policy to
challenge, or whether investors would have to challenge
domestic policies that states enacted in accordance with their
commitments made in the international agreements.
E.S.L v. Spain is, in many ways, illustrative of how such a
claim would work. In E.S.L v. Spain, Spain adopted a Royal
Decree incentivizing the production of renewable energy in
response to a 2001 EU directive that set out targets for EU
member countries to develop renewable energy, similar to EU
Directive 2018/2001/EC.138 Based largely on the Royal Decree,
the Claimants decided to invest in a solar energy project in
Spain.139 Years later, Spain’s new prime minister adopted a
Royal Decree that both reduced the subsidies Claimants
expected to receive under the initial Royal Decree, and placed a
tax on Claimants’ operation.140 As a result, Claimants’
investment lost almost all of its value.141 Claimants were then
able to bring an ISDS claim against Spain and recovered
137. Samples, supra note 10.
138. See E.S.L v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 101 (citing EU Directive
2001/77/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 238) 33-44).
139. Id. ¶ 121.
140. Id. ¶ 348.
141. Id. ¶ 154.
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damages.
In principle, as a result of a case like E.S.L. v. Spain, states
should be incentivized to maintain policies that are consistent
with their Directives and agreements in order to avoid going
through ISDS cases and potentially paying out substantial
damages. Even if an investor claimant’s case fails and they are
not awarded damages, the state would still have to go through
the lengthy and expensive process of arbitration or settlement.
A similar case could be brought against a state that enacts a
policy inconsistent with the Paris Agreement instead of an EU
Directive.
B. Potential Roadblocks
In theory, using ISDS to enforce international
environmental commitments could work. There are, a number
of foreseeable roadblocks that such a claim would have to
overcome.
As a jurisdictional requirement, in order to bring an ISDS
claim there must be an IIA between the investor state and the
host state that provides for ISDS to govern breaches of the IIA.
However, with BITs between individual countries and
multilateral agreements between groups of countries, the
jurisdictional hurdle likely would not be a great one.142
Another potential issue with using ISDS to enforce
environmental obligations is that deterrence is the primary
consequence which could, in principle, drive states to fulfill their
commitments. A winning claimant is not obligated to use its
award to reinvest in renewable energy, or to use the money in
any pro-environment way.143 The positive environmental impact
from these cases would come instead from incentivizing states to

142. See generally The Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID
WORLD
BANK
DATABASE,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-TreatiesDatabase.aspx#a61 (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (collecting a comprehensive
database of all existing BITs by Party. Major developed countries who have
either signed the Paris Agreement or are part of the EU and would be prime
targets for these claims have BITs in place with over one hundred other
countries). Countries with over hundred BITs include: Belgium-Luxembourg,
China, Czech Republic, France, German, Italy, Netherlands, Romania,
Switzerland, and the UK. Id.
143. Simson, supra note 9.
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fulfill their commitments in order to avoid paying large ISDS
damages.144
Additionally, the damages themselves may not be
sufficiently detrimental to a state to serve as an effective
deterrence. From an economic standpoint, the state’s fossil fuel
industry, for example, could benefit the state’s economy more
than paying off ISDS damages would hurt. In that case, the
ISDS damages alone probably would not be enough to urge the
state to enact policies favoring renewable energy over fossil
fuels.
The last, and perhaps greatest potential hurdle for ISDS
claims is the standard of review. As explained by the tribunal in
E.S.L. v. Spain, sovereign states have the right to modify their
policies, and investors must expect reasonable modifications.145
To constitute a breach of treaty obligations, policy changes must
be substantially unforeseeable and drastic. There are many
ISDS cases challenging States’ policy changes when the changes
were not found to amount to a breach.146 For example, in Philip
Morris v. Uruguay, the claimants, investors in a cigarette
company, challenged Uruguay’s regulatory changes precluding
tobacco manufacturers from marketing certain variants of
cigarettes and increased the size of health warnings on cigarette
packages.147 The tribunal determined that the regulatory
changes did not have a substantial effect on the claimants’
investment, and did not constitute a breach of a relevant BIT.148
In E.S.L. v. Spain, the tribunal found that Spain’s policy
changes were substantial and did constitute a breach of the
ECT.149 In that case, the regulatory regime under which
claimants invested was drastically overhauled and practically
deprived the claimants’ investment of all value.150
Environmentalists should be strategic in choosing which
ISDS claims to pursue to enforce states’ environmental
commitments considering all of the aforementioned potential
roadblocks.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
E.S.L. v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 382.
See, e.g., Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 33.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 276.
E.S.L. v. Spain, supra note 13, ¶ 382.
Id. ¶ 413.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is intrinsic value in states publicly committing to
combat climate change through international agreements and
policies such as the Paris Agreement and EU Directive
2008/2001/EC, as they provide frameworks for states to enact
domestic climate policies.151
There are also, however,
substantive commitments within these agreements that, if
enforceable, would be instrumental in ensuring that states
actually follow through by enacting policies that mitigate
climate change and promote renewable energy. While many of
the substantive commitments made in international
environmental agreements are not internally enforceable, ISDS
may be a useful tool to enforce them. ISDS could be used to deter
states from acting inconsistent with their international
agreements because states may be liable for damages to
renewable energy investors hurt by the states’ policies.
There are a handful of potential reasons why using ISDS to
enforce states’ international commitments may prove difficult.152
However, the consequences of successfully enforcing such
commitments could be quite significant in combating climate
change.153 Environmentalists should give considerable thought
to the potential of ISDS as a mechanism to hold states
accountable for the substantive commitments made in
international environmental agreements.

151. Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, Climate Commons Law: The
Transformative Force of the Paris Agreement, 50 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 885,
889 (2018).
152. See supra Section V(B).
153. See 2014 Climate Change Synthesis Report, supra note 1, at 2
(noting that GHG emissions must be significantly reduced to mitigate climate
change); Paris Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2 (If enforced, Parties would be
required to hold the increase in global average temperature to below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels); EU Directive 2018/2001/EC, supra note 128,
¶ 30 (If enforced, Parties would be required to fulfill at least 32% of its energy
needs with renewable energy by 2030).
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